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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN INSIDER TRADING CASES
In recent years, international participation in securities trading has
increased dramatically.1 The volume of both foreign investment in United
States securities and United States investment in foreign securities has
risen during the past decade.2 Although internationalization of the
securities markets yields substantial benefits,' policing domestic securities
transactions becomes more difficult when foreign entities take part in
securities trading.4 For example, foreign banks that are subject to bank-
ing secrecy laws5 and that participate in securities transactions on behalf
I See Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An International
Analysis, 14 LAW & POLT IN INT'L Bus. 335,397 (1982) (securities markets becoming interna-
tionalized); Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, Secrecy Laws and Other Obstacles to Interna-
tional Cooperation, 4 J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 63,70 (1982) (international cooperation
necessary for effective supervision of securities markets); Thomas, ExtraterritorialApplica-
tion of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189,
190 (1982) (capital markets have become increasingly international) [hereinafter cited as
Extraterritorial Application]; Williams & Spencer, Regulation of International Securities
Markets: Towards a Greater Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 55,55 (1982) (idea
of world-wide securities market gaining increasing prominence); Thomas, Securities Regulators
Grapple with Extraterritoriality, Legal Times, Jan. 17, 1983, at 20, col. 1 (volume of transna-
tional securities transactions has increased dramatically) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Regulators].
2 See Securities Regulators, supra note 1, at 20, col. 1. Between approximately the
end of 1971 and 1981, American investment in foreign securities rose from $19.6 billion
to $62.1 billion. Id. Between 1971 and 1981, foreign investment in United States securities
rose from $25.6 billion to $74 billion. Id.
3 See Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 56 (properly functioning international
securities market would increase global welfare); Securities Regulators, supra note 1, at
20, col. 1 (international securities transactions will promote free flow of capital and efficient
allocation of world resources). A properly functioning world securities market would per-
mit a more efficient allocation of scarce world resources. Williams & Spencer, supra note
1, at 56. A world-wide securities market would allow corporations to broaden their owner-
ship and sell their securities in a wider market. Id. An international securities market would
provide investors with a greater investment choice. Id. Investors would be able to select
not only between industries and companies, but also between different economies and cur-
rencies. Id.
See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 378-79, 380, 388-91 (foreign bank secrecy
laws hinder enforcement of insider trading laws); Pozen, International Securities Markets:
Comparative Disclosure Requirements, 3 J. CoMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG.392, 392 (1981) (extent
to which securities regulators should require disclosure from foreign issuers); Extraterritorial
Application, supra note 1, at 190 (problems of extraterritorial application of United States
securities laws); Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 57 (same); Note, American Adjudica-
tion of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553-63 (1976) (extraterritorial
application of United States' antifraud laws). See generally Securities Regulators, supra note
1 (problems of regulating foreigners' participation in United States securities transactions).
I See U.S. Aides Seek to Ease Bank-Secrecy Laws in Other Nations After Signing Swiss
Pact, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (banks of Switzerland, Cayman Islands, Panama,
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of bank customers often are prohibited, under the laws of the banks' home
countries, from disclosing any information about the banks' customers.'
Since the banks must keep customers' names confidential, bank secrecy
laws impede regulatory authorities' attempts to learn the identities of
persons using foreign banks to execute insider trading transactions.7
Foreign bank secrecy laws thus interfere with enforcement of laws pro-
hibiting insider trading in securities.'
In the United States, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' ('34 Act)
and Bahamas subject to bank secrecy laws) [hereinafter cited as Ease Bank-Secrecy]; infra
notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussion of Swiss bank secrecy laws); infra note 105
(United Kingdom and Belgium have bank secrecy laws).
I See Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1972) (Swiss
banks may provide stock brokerage services); Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 378-79,
380, 388-91 (foreign bank secrecy laws hinder enforcement of insider trading prohibitions);
Kronstein, SEC Practice: A Haven Lost?, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 91,91 (1982) (Americans alleged-
ly have used Swiss bank accounts to manipulate trading in securities on United States
markets); Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 67-78 (foreign bank secrecy laws
hinder enforcement of insider trading prohibitions); Mfiller, Banking and Economic Con-
fidentiality Under Swiss Law, in SECRET FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS 7, 10 (R. Needham ed. 1971)
(Swiss banks may not disclose customer information to private parties or governmental
authorities); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1976) (manag-
ing director of Cayman bank refused to testify concerning bank customers who allegedly
violated United States securities and tax laws on grounds that testifying would violate
Cayman bank secrecy laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v. Frank, 520
F.2d 1287, 1289, 1290 (2d Cir. 1975) (stock manipulators utilized Swiss banking facilities
to carry out illegal trading scheme), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); SEC v. Banca della
Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145,
92,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss bank refused to disclose names of customers on grounds that
disclosure would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws); Legal Times, Jan. 31, 1983, at 4, col.
1 (highest court of Switzerland ruled that Swiss authorities may not release to SEC
certain Swiss bank information that SEC sought in investigation of insider trading case).
American banks must disclose information about bank customers' accounts when United
States government authorities request the information pursuant to the Right to Financial
Privacy Act. See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697-3710
(codified at 12 U.S.C. S 3401-3422 (Supp. V 1981)).
1 See HR. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4394,4397 (secret foreign bank accounts have allowed Americans and others to avoid
securities laws and regulations) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; Hawes, Lee & Robert,
supra note 1, at 378-80, 388-91 (bank secrecy laws have hindered efforts of British, French
and American authorities to learn identities of persons trading on inside information); Meyer,
Swiss Bank Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw. ENG. L. REV.
18, 50 (1978) (by channeling stock market operations through Swiss banks, insiders may
realize illegal profits without risk of detection); infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text
(United States laws against insider trading); infra note 122 (French, British, and German
laws against insider trading).
' See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 67 (bank secrecy laws are great
deterrent to effective supervision of securities markets); Note, Swiss Banks Can Be Com-
pelled to Disclose Identities of Clients Suspected of Insider Trading, 13 SETON HALL L. REV.
91, 91 (1982) (Swiss bank secrecy laws have frustrated attempts to police international trans-
actions on securities markets) [hereinafter cited as Compelled to Disclose].
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. S 78 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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and regulations promulgated under the '34 Act 0 prohibit insider trading
in securities.11 Corporate insiders who possess material inside informa-
tion either must disclose the information to the investing public or must
abstain from trading in or recommending the security concerned while
the inside information remains undisclosed.' The Securities and Exchange
Commission" (SEC) has the authority to investigate violations of the '34
Act.14 To carry out investigations, the SEC may subpoena witnesses and
require production of documents. 5 Furthermore, the SEC may invoke
judicial assistance to enforce compliance with the SEC's demands for
information. 6
The SEC's demands for information have come into conflict with
Switzerland's bank secrecy laws. 7 Swiss bank secrecy laws protect from
disclosure all personal and business information that banks obtain in con-
10 17 C.F.R. 5 240 (1982).
11 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78p(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1982). The '34 Act pro-
hibits use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to employ manipulative
or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b);
see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (list of unlawful manipulative devices). The Exchange Act defines
interstate commerce as trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
states or between any foreign country and any state. 15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(17). In addition,
to prevent unfair use of corporate information, a corporation may recover profits that the
corporation's directors and officers and certain beneficial owners of the corporation's securities
realized from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the corporation's'securities
within a six-month period. Id. S 78p(b).
11 See In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911, 912 (1961); see also Vohs v. Dickson,
495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974) (material fact is fact that would influence reasonable in-
vestor's decision regarding securities transaction); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz,
464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972) (whether inside information is material depends upon whether
reasonable man would attach importance to information in determining whether to engage
in securities transaction); 15 U.S.C. S 78p(a(b) (1976) (to prevent unfair use of company
information, company may recover profits that certain insiders realized from purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of company's securities within six month period). Under the
Exchange Act, a corporation's officers, directors, and controlling shareholders traditionally
have had a duty either to disclose material inside information or to refrain from trading
in the corporation's securities until the inside information has been disclosed. See Cady
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 (duty to disclose traditionally placed on corporation's of-
ficers, directors, and controlling shareholders); Note, Corporate Outsider May Be Liable for
Failure to Disclose or Abstain Under Rule lob-5 Based on Employer-Employee Fiduciary Rela-
tionship, 13 SETrON HALL L. REv. 178, 182-88 (1982) (evolution of disclose or abstain rule); cf.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30,235 (1980) (duty to disclose nonpublic market
information under Exchange Act S 10(b) does not arise from mere possession of information).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (creation of SEC).
Id. 5 78u(a) (1976).
11 Id. 78u(b).
"Id. 5 78u(c).
17 See, e.g., SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss bank refused to disclose names of bank
customers on grounds that disclosure would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws); Compelled
To Disclose, supra. note 8, at 91 (Swiss bank secrecy laws preclude SEC from ascertaining
identities of persons who fraudulently trade on United States securities markets through
11511983]
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nection with the business transactions and consultations of the banks'
customers." Swiss law allows Swiss bankers to disclose information about
bank customers only when Swiss legislation, 9 international agreements,"0
Swiss banks); Ease Bank-Secrecy, supra note 5, at 6, col. 3 (persons have used Swiss banks
as conduits for insider transactions).
18 See Mueller, Swiss Banking Secret 18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 360,362 (1969) (Swiss bank
secrecy pertains to all personal and business items of which bank obtains knowledge in
connection with bank's business with client); Miiller, supra note 6, at 10 (same).
" See Meyer, supra note 7, at 31 (banker's obligation to secrecy overridden to extent
that Swiss statutes impose duty to disclose banking information); Moller, supra note 6, at
11, 15 (Swiss federal and cantonal statutes govern banker's duty to disclose banking infor-
mation). Swiss bank secrecy laws allow a banker to testify to otherwise secret information
only when a Swiss federal or cantonal statue permits the banker to testify and when a
Swiss court or administrative authority having jurisdiction over the banker compels the
testimony. Id. at 11; see Meyer, supra note 7, at 31-32 (exceptions to bank secrecy under
Swiss federal and cantonal codes). The Swiss Confederation and each of the Swiss cantons
have distinct codes governing the extent to which a banker may testify to confidential banking
matters. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 31 (summary of Swiss federal and cantonal laws gover-
ning extent to which bankers must testify to confidential banking matters); Muiller, supra
note 6, at 11 (Swiss confederation and each Swiss canton have distinct codes concerning
extent to which banker must testify to confidential banking information). In criminal in-
vestigations and prosecutions, the codes generally require disclosure of banking informa-
tion. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 31 (Swiss federal and cantonal codes require bankers to
disclose banking information when information necessary for criminal investigation or pro-
secution); Mfiller, supra note 6, at 11-12 (same). In civil proceedings, however, only the Swiss
federal code and several cantonal codes provide for bankers to testify to banking matters.
Meyer, supra note 7, at 31-32.
' See Miller, supra note 6, at 15 (Swiss banker may disclose banking information when
international agreement provides for information's disclosure}, see also Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, March 18,1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444, -. U.N.T.S. - (procedure for gathering evidence from abroad in civil
cases) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Taking Evidence]. Based on international
agreements, Switzerland may assist other countries in the investigation of crimes. Mfiller,
supra note 6, at 15; see Memorandum on Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-
Switzerland, pt. 1, 2, reprinted in 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1737 (Oct. 8,
1982) (under certain circumstances Swiss banks may disclose customer information to United
States authorities when United States authorities require bank information to investigate
insider trading cases) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum on Insider Trading]; Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, art. 1,
27 U.S.T. 2019, 2025, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) (law enforcement
cooperation between United States and Switzerland) [hereinafter cited as Treaty on Mutual
Assistance]. A foreign tribunal that requires assistance with a criminal investigation must
submit a letter rogatory to the Swiss Federal Government's Departments of Justice and
Police. Miiller, supra note 6, at 16; see 28 U.S.C. S 1781 (1976) (transmittal of letter rogatory);
Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra, art. 28 (procedure for requesting Swiss assistance in
criminal matters); see also Convention on Taking Evidence, supra, arts. 24 (procedure for
requesting evidence in civil matters). The Swiss Departments of Justice and Police transmit
the request for assistance to the appropriate cantonal court or investigation office. Mfiller,
supra note 6, at 16; see Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra, art. 31(2) (transmittal of re-
quest for assistance to appropriate cantonal authority). Swiss cantonal law generally deter-
mines which banking information, if any, a foreigner may receive. Mueller, supra note 18,
at 374; Miiller, supra note 6, at 16; see Convention on Taking Evidence, supra, art. 11 (per-
son requested to give evidence may refuse to give evidence insofar as person has privilege
[Vol. 40:1149
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or principles of international reciprocity and comity' require divulging
the banking information.' In addition, Swiss banks may disclose customer
information if bank customers waive the banks' obligation of
confidentiality." Bankers who violate the Swiss banking secrecy obliga-
tions are subject to criminal sanctions.'
Foreign banks, particularly Swiss banks, have invoked foreign bank
secrecy laws as grounds for noncompliance with United States courts'
discovery orders.' Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles
or duty to refuse to give evidence under laws of state in which request executed). Foreign
courts usually may obtain Swiss banking information to the same extent that Swiss courts
may receive the information. Muiller, supra note 6, at 16.
2? See Mller, supra note 6, at 15 (principles of reciprocity and international comity
may provide for lifting Swiss bank secrecy); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895) (comity is recognition that nation allows within its territory to legislative, executive,
or judicial acts of another nation).
I See Mfiller, supra note 6, at 15. See generally Meyer, supra note 7, at 28-35 (excep-
tions to Swiss bank secrecy).
I See Meyer, supra note 7, at 29 (customer of Swiss bank may authorize bank to fur-
nish information about customer's bank account to third parties); Mueller, supra note 18,
at 363 (since bank client is master of client's banking information, client may authorize
bank to disclose client's banking information to third parties); see also Societe Internationale
Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 203 (1958)
(Swiss bank may secure waiver of confidentiality from bank customer;, SEC v. Banca della
Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
I Meyer, supra note 7, at 25-26; Mueller, supra note 18, at 362 n.4. Switzerland tradi-
tionally has recognized bank secrecy as a civil duty. Meyer, supra note 7, at 27. In 1934,
Switzerland enacted article 47 of the Banking Law, which made violations of bank secrecy
criminal offenses. Mueller, supra note 18, at 361-62. Bankers who intentionally violate secrecy
laws are subject to a fine of up to 20,000 francs, or imprisonment for up to six months,
or both. Id. at 362. Bankers who negligently violate secrecy laws are subject to a fine of
up to 10,000 francs. Id. Switzerland made violations of bank secrecy criminal offenses in
response to Nazi Germany's pressure on Swiss banks to disclose the identities of foreign
depositors. Meyer, supra note 7, at 25-26; see Mueller, supra note 18, at 361 (Switzerland
made breach of banking secrecy criminal offense to protect Jews and other victims of Nazi
Germany's policies from Nazi Germany's investigations of assets deposited in foreign banks).
2 See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 200, 204 (1958) (plaintiff claimed that Swiss bank secrecy laws
precluded plaintiff from complying with document production order); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1976) (managing director of Cayman Islands bank refused
to comply with grand jury subpoena on grounds that compliance would violate Cayman
bank secrecy law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
396 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1968) (United States bank refused to comply with subpoena re-
quiring production of documents located in bank's German branch because production would
subject bank to civil liability in Germany;, Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d
611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962) (United States bank requested modification of grand jury subpoena
to excuse bank from producing records in possession of bank's Panamanian branch on grounds
that production would subject bank to criminal penalties under Panamanian law); SEC v.
Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346,
at 92,145, 92,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss bank refused to disclose names of customers on
grounds that disclosure would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws).
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et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogerse is the seminal case on the use of foreign
nondisclosure law as a defense to noncompliance with a discovery order.'
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court considered whether a district
court erred in dismissing a Swiss holding company's complaint since the
company had failed to comply with a pretrial production order because
of possible criminal liability under Swiss secrecy laws.28 The plaintiff
holding company had brought suit to recover a German firm's assets that
the United States government had seized pursuant to the Trading with
the Enemy Act' (Enemy Act). The holding company based the lawsuit
on a provision of the Enemy Act that authorized any person not an enemy
or an ally of an enemy to recover seized assets to the extent of the per-
son's interest in the assets.2 The holding company claimed that because
the holding company was a national of a neutral power and the owner
of the German firm's seized assets, the holding company could recover
the assets.' The United States government challenged the plaintiffs claims
to ownership of the German firm's assets.2 2 The district court ordered
the plaintiff to produce certain bank records tending to show ownership
of the seized assets.
The Societe Internationale plaintiff moved for relief from production
of the bank records on the ground that production would violate Swiss
" 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see Meyer, supra note 7, at 41-42 (history of Societe Interna-
tionale litigation).
I See SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (decision of whether to compel foreign party
to disclose information when disclosure might subject foreign party to criminal liability
in party's home country must begin with analysis of Supreme Court's opinion in Societe
Internationale); Compelled To Disclose, supra note 8, at 95 (Societe Internationale is leading
case on conflict between discovery order and foreign nondisclosure law).
357 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 199; see Trading with the Enemy Act (Enemy Act), ch. 106, S 9(a), 40 Stat.
411, 419 (1917), amended, ch. 285, S 9(a), 42 Stat. 1511, 1511 (1923) (current version at 50
U.S.C. app. S 9(a) (1976)) (person having interest in enemy's seized assets may bring suit
to recover assets). During World War II, pursuant to the Enemy Act, the United States
Alien Property Custodian assumed control of assets that the Custodian found to be owned
by or held for the benefit of I.G. Farbenindustrie, a German firm and national enemy. 357
U.S. at 198-99; see Enemy Act, ch. 106, S 5(b), 40 Stat. 415, 417 (1917) (current version at
50 U.S.C. app. S 5(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (Alien Property Custodian may seize enemy's
assets). The LG. Farbenindustrie assets had a value of more than $100,000,000. 357 U.S.
at 199. The assets consisted of cash in American banks and stock in a Delaware corpora-
tion. Id. The Societe Internationale plaintiff brought suit to recover the I.G. Farbenindustire
assets. Id.
' 357 U.S. at 199; see Enemy Act, ch. 285, S 9(a), 42 Stat. 1511, 1511 (1923) (person
not enemy or ally of enemy may bring suit to recover enemy's seized assets to extent of
person's interest in seized assets).
" 357 U.S. at 199.
' Id. at 199. In addition to challenging the plaintiff holding company's ownership of
the I.G. Farbenindustrie assets, the government alleged that the plaintiff was connected
intimately with the German firm and hence was affected with enemy taint. Id.
See id. at 200 (district court ordered production of Swiss bank records).
1154 [Vol. 40:1149
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penal law.' The government moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the district court's produc-
tion order.n After giving the plaintiff time to comply with the production
order, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint. 8 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.1
7
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the holding company argued that
the district court erroneously ordered production of the banking
documents. 8 The Societe Internationale Court recognized that in enacting
the Enemy Act, Congress expressed concern over enemies using innocent
fronts to recover seized assets. 9 The Enemy Act thus requires a plaintiff
to prove his interest in seized assets as a condition to recovery of the
assets." The Court found that allowing the plaintiff to invoke Swiss secrecy
I Id. at 200. The Societe Internationale district court had referred the bank record
production controversy to a special master, who made findings of Swiss law relating to
the plaintiff holding company's situation. See id. at 201. The master noted that Swiss
authorities had "confiscated" the Swiss bank documents that the plaintiff should have pro-
duced. See id. Confiscation of the bank records amounted to an interdiction on the bank's
transmission of the records to third parties. See i&. The master found that the Swiss govern-
ment had acted in accordance with Swiss law by confiscating the bank documents. See id.
The master also found that the plaintiff has satisfied the obligation of making a good faith
effort to comply with the district court's production order. See id. The district court ac-
cepted the master's findings, but the court nevertheless granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. Id.; see infra note 36 and accompanying text (district
court dismissed plaintiffs complaint).
" See 357 U.S. at 200 (Societe Internationale defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs
complaint).
See id. at 201-03 (Societe Internationale district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (court may dismiss party's complaint if party fails to comply
with the court's discovery order). The plaintiff in Societe Internationals had proposed a plan
for examining the Swiss bank records whose discovery the district court had ordered. Id.
at 203; see supra text accompanying note 33 (district court had ordered production of Swiss
bank records). The plaintiff had proposed that the parties to the litigation, the district court,
and the Swiss authorities appoint a neutral expert to examine bank files. 357 U.S. at 203.
After inspecting the files, the expert, without violating Swiss secrecy laws, would submit
to the parties a report identifying documents that the expert found relevant to the litiga-
tion. Id. The plaintiff then would seek to obtain waivers of confidentiality or secure the
relevant documents by using letters rogatory or Swiss arbitration proceedings. Id.; see supra
note 20 (use of letters regatory). The Swiss authorities had approved the plaintiffs plan.
357 U.S. at 203. The district court, however, refused to accept the plaintiff's scheme for
producing the bank records. See id. (district court did not accept plaintiffs discovery plan);
see also Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Brownell, 243 F.2d 254, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (affirming district court's decision to reject
plaintiff's discovery plan and quoting from district court's opinion giving reasons for rejec-
tion of plan), rev'd sub nom. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Com-
merciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
1 Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Brownell, 243 F.2d 254, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Societe Internationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
357 U.S. at 204.
Id. at 205.
4D See Enemy Act, ch. 285, 5 9(a), 42 Stat. 1511, 1511 (1923) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
115519831
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laws to avoid producing documents indicating ownership of seized assets
would frustrate congressional intent." The Court therefore held that con-
gressional concerns underlying the Enemy Act justified the district court's
issuance of a production order.! The holding company argued further that
the district court improperly dismissed the complaint since the company
had made a good faith effort to comply with the discovery order. 3 The
Court noted that, although the plaintiff had made a full attempt to comply
with the discovery order, the plaintiff was unable to comply because of
Swiss legal constraints.44 The Court consequently held that the district
court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint when the plaintiff had
established that failure to comply with the production order was due to
inability to comply rather than to the wilfullness, bad faith, or fault of
the plaintiff.45
In cases subsequent toSocieteInternationale, United States courts similar-
ly have ordered discovery despite possible conflicts with foreign secrecy laws."6
app. 5 9(a) (1976)) (to recover seized assets pursuant to Enemy Act, plaintiff must establish
plaintiff's interest or rights in seized property).
" 357 U.S. at 205.
42 Id. at 206.
," Id. at 208.
" Id. at 212. The Societe Internationale Court found that because the Swiss authorities
had not removed the bank records from the plaintiff holding company's possession, the
company continued to control the records despite the Swiss authorities' confiscation of the
documents. Id. at 204; see supra note 34 (Swiss authorities' confiscation of Swiss bank's
records). The Court nevertheless noted that fear of criminal prosecution abroad constituted
a strong excuse for the holding company's failure to produce the bank records. 357 U.S.
at 211. The Court further recognized that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the district
court's discovery order was due to circumstances outside the plaintiff's control. Id.
1 357 U.S. at 212. The Societe Internationale Court suggested that if the plaintiff holding
company had deliberately courted legal impediments to production of the Swiss bank records,
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint might have been warranted. Id.
at 208-09.
" See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992,
997 (10th Cir. 1977) (court ordered compliance with subpoena despite conflict with Canadian
law, but court declined to impose sanctions for noncompliance); Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976) (court ordered production of documents
even though production allegedly would violate Swiss secrecy laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1096 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976) (court ordered
witness to comply with subpoena and testify before grand jury even though testifying could
subject witness to criminal prosecution in Cayman Islands), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1977);
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 887, 901 (2d Cir. 1968) (court held bank
in contempt for failure to comply with subpoena even though compliance could subject bank
to civil liability under German law); SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court ordered production
of Swiss bank records even though production could violate Swiss bank secrecy laws); Vesco
v. SEC, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,160, at 91-157-3 (D.N.J. 1971)
(court ordered compliance with subpoena even though compliance allegedly would violate
Swiss secrecy laws). But see, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613
(2d Cir. 1962) (court excused witness from producing documents on grounds that production
would violate Panamanian law); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960) (court
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In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver,47 the Tenth Circuit recognized the
Societe Internationale Court's distinction between ordering production of
documents subject to foreign secrecy laws and imposing sanctions for non-
productionof the documents. 48 InArthurAndersen, the State of Ohio brought
suit against Arthur Andersen & Company (Andersen), asserting that
Andersen had violated securities laws by issuing financial statements that
fraudulently misrepresented a corporation's financial condition.49 The State
of Ohio claimed that the State had purchased the corporation's securities in
reliance on Andersen's financial statements. 5 In connection with the litiga-
tion, the State of Ohio requested Andersen to produce various documents
located in Andersen's Switzerland office." Andersen refused to produce the
documents, claiming that production would violate Swiss secrecy laws .2 The
district court granted Ohio's motion for discovery of the documents.3 The
Tenth Circuit recognized thatSocieteInternationale does not require a court
to refuse to order discovery when discovery would violate foreign laws.- The
ArthurAndersen court instead noted that under SocieteInternationale, a court
modified production order to excuse witness from producing Canadian bank records because
production would violate Canadian law). Although United States courts have ordered
discovery notwithstanding conflicting foreign nondisclosure laws, the courts have declined
to impose sanctions for noncompliance with the discovery orders unless the noncomplying
party had acted in bad faith. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d at 998 (contempt sanctions unjustified because witness did not act in bad
faith by failing to comply with subpoena); State of Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570
F.2d 1370, 1374, 1376 (10th Cir. 1978) (sanctions justified because defendant had acted in
bad faith by contriving defense of secrecy laws as excuse for noncompliance with discovery
order), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145,92,146,92,148 (court threatened
sanctions because court found that bank had acted in bad faith by deliberately making use
of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade American securities laws); see also infra note 92 (discussion
of good faith standard).
47 546 F2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
" Id. at 341, 342; see supra text accompanying notes 38-45 (Societe Internationale Court's
decision).
11 546 F.2d at 340. The Arthur Andersen district court had jurisdiction based on S 22(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 and on S 27 of the '34 Act. Id. at 340-31; see 15 U.S.C. S 77v(a)
(1976) (district court has jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce Securities Act of 1933);
id. § 78aa (district court has jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce '34 Act).





Id. at 341, 342. The Arthur Andersen court did not accept Arthur Andersen and
Company's (Andersen) contention that international comity prevents a United States court
from ordering action that violates foreign law. Id. at 342. The Arthur Andersen court noted
that if the court's order could result in a breach of relations between nations, Andersen
should have brought the matter to the State Department's attention. Id. The court sug-
gested that the State Department could then decide whether to petition the court to refrain
from issuing the order. See id.; cf. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897,
904 (2d Cir. 1968) (in deciding to enforce subpoena when compliance with subpoena alleged-
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should consider foreign legal constraints when deciding whether to im-
pose sanctions for noncompliance with a discovery order.
56
In a recent insider trading action, a Swiss bank, the Banca della
Svizzera Italiana (the bank), unsuccessfully asserted that Swiss bank
secrecy laws should excuse the bank from disclosing the identities of bank
customers suspected of insider trading.- In SEC v. Banca della Svizzera
Italiana,5 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York threatened to impose sanctions against the bank if the bank
failed to disclose the customers' identities. 9 The bank had purchased stock
and ten day call options in St. Joe Minerals Corporation (St. Joe), a New
York corporation."0 On the day after the purchase, a subsidiary of Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. announced a cash tender offer for all of the St.
ly would result in civil liability under German law, court considered that neither United
States nor German government had objected to enforcement of subpoena).
In deciding to order production of documents when production might violate foreign
law, the Arthur Andersen court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Societe Interna-
tionale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers. See 546 F.2d at
341-42; see also Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commercials, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text (discussion of Societe
Internationale). The Societe Internationale Court held that the policies behind the legisla-
tion on which the lawsuit was based justified the issuance of a document production order.
357 U.S. at 206. The Arthur Andersen court, on the other hand, did not consider whether
policies underlying the securities laws, which Andersen allegedly had violated, supported
the district court's issuance of a production order. See 546 F.2d at 34142. The Arthur Andersen
decision therefore suggests that courts may order production of documents, even when
production may violate foreign law, without considering whether declining to order produc-
tion would frustrate legislative intent.
' 546 F.2d at 341,342. Andersen ultimately failed to comply with the Arthur Andersen
court's document production order. State of Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370,
1371 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes
51, 53-54 (court ordered Andersen to produce certain documents). The district court imposed
sanctions against Andersen for noncompliance with the discovery order. See 570 F.2d at
1372. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that Andersen had claimed that Swiss secrecy
laws prevented production of the documents when Andersen had not even known the con-
tents of the documents whose production the court required. Id. at 1373-74. The appellate
court further found that Andersen had not known how Swiss secrecy laws applied to pro-
duction of the documents at the time that Andersen had claimed secrecy laws as an excuse
for nonproduction. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Andersen's claims that Swiss secrecy
laws prevented production were mere diversionary tactics. Id. at 374. The Tenth Circuit
thus found that Andersen's bad faith justified the district court's imposition of sanctions.
Id. at 1374, 1376.
" See SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,144,92,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss bank must answer interrogatories
requesting information on bank customers even though bank's disclosure of customer infor-
mation violates Swiss bank secrecy laws); infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of Banca della Svizzera); supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussion of Swiss
bank secrecy laws).
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 92,145.
o Id. at 92,144. Banca della Svizzera Italiana (the bank) purchased common stock of
the St. Joe Minerals Corp. (St. Joe) through the New York Stock Exchange. Id. The bank
purchased St. Joe options through the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Id.
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Joe common stockW ' The bank subsequently instructed its brokers to sell
the St. Joe common stock and close out the St. Joe options.2 The trans-
actions yielded profits of approximately two million dollars, which the bank
deposited in its account with an American bank. 3
The SEC, noticing substantial activity on the options market, in-
vestigated the trading in St. Joe options." The SEC subsequently brought
suit against the bank and other unnamed parties for an injunction and
violations of the insider trading provisions of the '34 Act.' The SEC con-
tended that the bank performed the transactions in St. Joe securities on
behalf of corporate insiders who traded on the basis of material, non-public
information about the upcoming tender offer.' For eight months, the SEC
employed various discovery techniques in an attempt to learn the iden-
tities of the persons for whom the bank had purchased and sold the St.
Joe securities." The SEC's discovery requests proved unavailing, however,
since the bank, asserting its obligations under Swiss bank secrecy laws,
refused to disclose the identities of the bank customers.66
In November 1981, the Banca, dell Svizzera court ordered the bank
to disclose the identites of the bank customers involved in the St. Joe
securities transactions.69 The district court threatened to impose severe
contempt sanctions if the bank failed to comply with the order."0 The court
61 Id.
62 Id.
' Id. at 92,144-45. The bank deposited proceeds of the sale of the St. Joe securities
in the bank's account with the Irving Trust, an American bank. See id. at 92,145.
64Id.
Id. at 92,144. The SEC brought suit against the bank and other unnamed parties
pursuant to S 21(d) of the '34 Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d) (1976) (SEC may bring action
to enjoin violations of '34 Act). The SEC alleged that the bank and unnamed others violated
SS 10(b) and 14(e) of the '34 Act and rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 of the regulations promulgated
under the '34 Act. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,144;
see 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1976) (use of manipulative or deceptive device in connection with
purchase or sale of security); id. S 78n(e) (fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive acts
in connection with tender offer); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) (employment of manipulative
and deceptive devices); id. S 240.14e-3 (transactions in securities on basis of material, non-
public information in context of tender offer). Sections 21(e) and 27 of the '34 Act conferred
jurisdiction on the district court to hear the SEC's suit. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,144; see 15 U.S.C. S 78u(e) (district court has jurisdiction
to issue injunctions and orders to enforce compliance with '34 Act); id. S 78aa (district court's
jurisdiction). The district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the
bank carried on business in New York City. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,346, at 92,144; see 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (suit to enforce '34 Act may be brought in
district where defendant is found).
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145; see supra note
59 (provisions of '34 Act that SEC contended bank violated).
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145.
Id; see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss bank secrecy laws).
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145.
Id. Contempt sanctions that the Banca della Svizzera court contemplated imposing
on the bank included a daily fine and an order that the bank cease further direct and in-
direct trading on the United States securities markets, except trading to liquidate the bank's
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issued an opinion detailing the basis for ordering the bank to disclose in-
formation about bank customers.7 The Banca della Svizzera court, employ-
ing the balancing test set forth in section 40 of the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States72 (Restatement (Second)),
recognized that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining the
integrity of the United States' financial markets.7" The court noted that
the use of secret foreign bank accounts thwarts enforcement of the United
States securities laws.74 The court found that the bank had acted in bad
faith by deliberately undertaking the St. Joe transactions with the expec-
tation of using Swiss nondisclosure laws to evade liability under the United
States laws against insider trading.75 Since the bank had acted in bad faith,
portfolio. Kronstein, supra note 6, at 92. At the time the court threatened sanctions, no
United States court ever had excluded a foreign bank from trading on the United States
securities markets. See id.
Subsequent to the court's announcement of the decision to impose sanctions, the bank
obtained waivers of confidentiality from the bank customers suspected of insider trading.
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145. Since the bank's
customers had waived the bank's obligation of bank secrecy, the bank was free to disclose
the customers' indentities to the SEC without being in violation of Swiss bank secrecy
laws. See id. at 92,149 (bank customers' waivers of confidentiality permitted bank to disclose
customers' banking information); supra note 23 and accompanying text (Swiss bank customer
may waive bank's obligation of confidentiality). The bank also had answered some of the
SEC's interrogatories. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145.
Since the bank had taken steps to comply with the district court's order, the court did
not impose the threatened sanctions. See id. at 92,145, 92,149.
" See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,145 (Banca
della Svizzera court analyzed legal questions that court's issuance of discovery order
presented).
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATESS 40 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; see infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text
(discussion of section 40 of Restatement (Second)).
" [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,148.
7' Id.
" Id. at 92,149. The Banca della Svizzera court's finding of bad faith represents an
expansion of the good faith analysis that the Supreme Court enunciated in Societe Interna-
tionale. Compare id. at 98,148 (bank acted in bad faith by deliberately using foreign non-
disclosure law to evade American securities laws) withSociete Internationale Pour Participa-
tions Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 203, 211 (1958) (by attempting
to gain release of Swiss bank records without violating Swiss law, plaintiff made good faith
attempt to comply with production order). The Societe Internationale Court analyzed good
faith in terms of a party's efforts to comply with a production order, whereas the Banca
della Svizzera court found that a party had acted in bad faith because the party made use
of foreign secrecy laws to engage in an unlawful transaction. See id. at 212-13 (plaintiff's
failure to comply with production order due to plaintiff's inability to comply rather than
to plaintiff's willfulness, bad faith, or fault); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,346, at 92,148 (bank acted in bad faith by making deliberate use of Swiss non-
disclosure law to evade American laws against insider trading). If a person deliberately
makes use of foreign secrecy laws to shield activity that violates the United States laws,
the person should bear responsibility when foreign secrecy laws prohibit the person from
disclosing the information in an American legal proceeding. To permit a person to refuse
to disclose the information that foreign secrecy laws protect would encourage the use of
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the Banca della Svizzera court rejected the bank's argument that the ex-
istence of criminal sanctions under Swiss law should excuse the bank from
producing information about the bank's customers. 8
Although the bank would be subject to liability under Swiss law for
disclosing the names of bank customers, the Banca della Svizzera court
did not violate international law by ordering the bank to take action that
would violate the laws of another country." Section 39 of the Restatement
(Second) provides that a country may exercise its jurisdiction 8 to prescribe'
secret foreign bank accounts to conceal unlawful transactions. See HOUSE REPORT, supra,
note 7, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4394, 4397 (by using secret
foreign bank accounts, Americans have concealed unlawul securities transactions). Conse-
quently, if the Banca della Svizzea court was correct in finding that the Swiss bank defendant
knowingly utilized Swiss secrecy laws to conceal an unlawful transaction, the court's con-
clusion that the bank was at fault in failing to produce information about the transaction
would be sound. See id. (bank made deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade
American securities laws). No evidence before the court, however, suggested that the bank
knew that the customers were corporate insiders. See id. at 92,148, 92,149 (bank acted in
bad faith); Kronstein, supra note 6, at 93 (no evidence suggested bank's knowledge of
customers' possession of inside information); Compelled To Diclose, supra note 8, at 113 (no
evidence to support Banca della Svizzera court's conclusion that bank deliberately courted
legal impediments to discovery of bank information); see also Meyer, supra note 7, at 46,
52 (Swiss banks generally have neither means nor ability to ascertain whether customers
use bank services to evade United States laws). The Banca della Svizzera court therefore
should have given further consideration to the role that the bank played in the St. Joe
securities transaction before the court concluded that the bank acted in bad faith by engag-
ing in the transaction. See Kronsein, supra note 6, at 93 (bank merely executed customers'
orders by purchasing and selling St. Joe securities).
70 See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,149. The Ban-
ca della Svizzera court, in contrast to the Arthur Andersen court, did not perceive a need
to distinguish between the analysis that a court should employ for deciding to issue an
order compelling discovery and the analysis that a court should use for determining whether
to impose sanctions for noncompliance with a discovery order. See id. at 92,148 n.3; see
also Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976) (presence of
foreign legal constraints relevant to issue of whether court should impose sanctions for
nondiscovery but not relevant to question of whether court should issue discovery order),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977). The Banca della Svizzera court explained that the distinc-
tion in analysis would make little difference in the outcome of the Banca della Svizzera
case. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,148 n.3.
7 See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (international legal considerations ap-
plied to nations' conflicting laws).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at S 6 (term "jurisdiction", as used in Restate-
ment (Second), means capacity of nation under international law to prescribe or enforce
rule of law); infra note 79 (jurisdiction to prescribe law); infra note 80 (jurisdiction to en-
force law).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at SS 17, 18, 30. Section 17 of the Restate-
ment (Second) confers upon a nation jurisdiction to prescribe laws concerning conduct that
occurs within the state's territory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at S 17(a); see SEC
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115, 116 (3d Cir.) (court has subject matter jurisdiction over securities
fraud case when fraudulent acts perpetrated in United States), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977); ]T v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); see also Fidenas A.G.
v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 10
(2d Cir. 1979) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because fraudulent conduct occurred
1983] 1161
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1149
or enforce ' a law even though the exercise of jurisdiction would require
a person to engage in conduct subjecting the person to liability under
the laws of another country that also has jurisdiction over the person's
conduct.' Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) lists five factors that coun-
tries should weigh to minimize conflicts that may arise from the applica-
tion of section 39.' The factors that countries should consider to moderate
primarily abroad). See generally Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities
Laws: The Need for Reassessment, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 529 (1980) (jurisdictional problems
that courts encounter when applying federal securities laws to international transactions)
[hereinafter cited as Need for Reassessment]. Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) confers
upon a nation jurisdiction to prescribe laws that attach consequences to conduct that oc-
curs outside the nation's territory and that causes an effect within the nation's territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at S 18; see Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 546 F.2d 133,
135, 136 (9th Cir. 1977) (United States court has subject matter jurisdiction over '34 Act
violation that occurs outside United States when corporation's securities registered and
listed on United States exchange and when violation adversely affects United States buyers,
sellers, and holders of corporation's securities); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
208-09 (court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of '34 Act that occur outside
United States when violations produce detrimental effects within United States), modified
on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (nation may impose liabilities
for conduct that occurs outside nation's borders and that produces reprehensible effects
within nation's borders). See generally Need for Reassessment, supra, at 529-56 (jurisdictional
problems that courts encounter when applying federal securities laws to international tran-
sactions). Section 30 of the Restatement (Second) authorizes a country to prescribe laws that
attach consequences to conduct of the country's nationals wherever the conduct occurs.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at S 30(a); see Need for Reassessment, supra, at 531 n.2
(United States courts unwilling to find jurisdiction when nationality principle enunciated
in Restatement (Second) S 30 provides sole basis for assertion of jurisdiction).
I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at § 7 (relationship between jurisdiction
to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce laws); id. S 20 (jurisidiction to enforce laws within
nation's territory). A nation does not have jurisdiction to enforce a law unless the nation
had jurisdiction to prescribe the law that the nation seeks to enforce. Id. S 7(2); see supra
note 79 (jurisdiction to prescribe law). Since enforcement jurisdiction is limited to a nation's
own territory, a nation that has jurisdiction to prescribe a law may not have jurisdiction
to enforce the law in all instances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra. note 72, at 5 7(1) (nation
having jurisdiction to prescribe law does not have jurisdiction to enforce law in all instances);
id. § 20 (nation has jurisdiction to enforce within nation's territory law that nation validly
prescribed); see also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1316 & n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (nation's enforcement jurisdiction limited to nation's territorial
boundaries).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at § 39. In the United States, a court's exercise
of jurisdiction must comport with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972); see U.S.
CONST. amend V (person shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law). When a defendant has acted within a state or sufficiently caused consequences
within a state, the state's tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant's person.
468 F.2d at 1340.
-See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at §§ 39,40. Several courts have relied on
the balancing test set forth in S 40 of the Restatement (Second) or on similar balancing
tests when deciding whether to apply United States laws to international matters. See,
e.g., United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-33 (9th Cir.) (court employed balancing
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the exercise of their enforcement jurisdiction include the vital national
interests of each of the countries,' the extent and nature of the hardship
that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person 4 and
the extent to which the required conduct will take place in the other
country.' In addition, countries should consider the nationality of the per-
son who must comply with nations' conflicting laws86 and the extent to
which each country's enforcement action can achieve compliance with the
law that each country prescribes.8 7
Under Societe Internationale" and principles of foreign relations law,89
United States courts having personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank may
order production of bank information that relates to possible insider
trading violations despite the existence of foreign laws that prohibit
disclosure of the information." The Societe Internationale Court noted,
however, that fear of criminal prosecution abroad constitutes a strong
defense to noncompliance with a production order." The Societe Inter-
test enunciated in 5 40 of Restatement (Second) to weigh competing national interests),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.,
549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (court developed balancing test to determine whether
United States court should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust case); SEC v.
Banca della Svizzera Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346,
at 92,148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court used balancing test set fourth in 5 40 of Restate-
ment (Second) to determine whether court should order disclosure of information when
disclosure would violate foreign law); cf. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1154-56 (N.D. IlM. 1979) (court criticized balancing test enunciated in Restatement (Second)
S 40 and developed alternative balancing test to determine whether court should order
production of documents protected by foreign nondisclosure law); Pansius, Resolving Con-
flicts with Foreign Nondisclosure Laws: An Analysis of the Vetco Case, 12 DENVER J. INTL
L. & POLY 13, 21-23, 33 (1982) (criticizing balancing test set forth in Restatement (Second)
5 40 and suggesting that courts adopt alternative test for deciding whether to order
production of information that foreign secrecy laws protect).
WRESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 72, at S 40(a); see id. comment b and illustrations
3 & 4 (vital national interests explained).
Id. S 40(b); see id. comment c (hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose
upon person); id. reporters' note I (United States' courts resolution of hardship questions);
cf. id. § 30 comment c (effect of sanctions imposed under foreign law).
91 Id. S 40(c).
Id. S 40(d); see id. comments c & d and reporters' note 3 (effect of nationality of person).
Id. S 40(e); see id. comment e (effectiveness of countries' enforcement of laws).
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
" See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (principles of foreign relations law
that apply to countries' conflicting laws).
I See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir.) (court affirmed en-
forcement of contempt sanctions for noncompliance with summons even though compliance
might constitute violation of foreign law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (court ordered com-
pliance with subpoena despite conflict with Canadian law, but court declined to impose
sanctions for noncompliance); Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341, 342
(10th Cir. 1976) (court ordered production of documents even though production allegedly
would violate Swiss law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); SEC v. Banca della Svizzera
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nationale Court indicated that a court should not impose sanctions on a
party who makes a good faith effort to obey a production order' but who
hesitates to produce the information because foreign law prohibits
disclosure of the information 3 Thus, the Societe Internationale decision
suggests that a foreign bank which attempts to obtain required informa-
tion without violating the laws of the bank's home country may avoid sanc-
tions even though the bank's attempts to obtain the information in accor-
dance with foreign law are unsuccessful.94 Applying sanctions against a
party would be unfair when circumstances beyond the party's control
hinder compliance with a production order.95 Allowing the required infor-
mation to escape production, however, encourages persons violating the
insider trading laws to utilize foreign banks subject to secrecy laws as
unwitting accomplices to unlawful schemes.9" Foreign bank secrecy laws
thus can shield information on illegal securities transactions from the SEC's
scrutiny.9
Italiana, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (court ordered production of Swiss bank records even though production would violate
Swiss secrecy laws).
" Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958).
92 See id. at 201, 203, 211 (by attempting to gain release of Swiss bank records without
violating Swiss law, Societe Internationale plaintiff made good faith effort to achieve com-
pliance with production order); Compelled to Disclose, supra note 8, at 112-13 (for good faith
to exist, party must maximize his efforts to disclose information that court ordered); cf.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 1001-02 (10th Cir.
1977) (Doyle, J., dissenting) (party acted in bad faith by colluding with foreign government
to achieve promulgation of nondisclosure regulation); SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss
bank acted in bad faith by making deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade United
States laws against insider trading).
" See 357 U.S. at 212-13 (Societe Internationale Court declined to enforce sanctions
against plaintiff because although plaintiff made good faith effort to obey discovery order,
Swiss secrecy laws prohibited compliance with order). But see United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1968) (court imposed sanctions for disobedience
of subpoena, noting that possibility of civil sanctions under German law not adequate justifica-
tion for disobedience).
" See 357 U.S. at 212-13 (district court erred in dismissing Societe Internationale plain-
tiff's complaint when plaintiff had established that failure to comply with production order
was due to inability to comply rather than to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of plaintiff).
"5 See id. at 211 (Societe Internationale plaintiffs failure to comply with production
order was due to circumstances beyond plaintiffs control).
9 See Kronstein, supra note 6, at 93 (Swiss bank might execute securities transactions
without knowing that bank customers are corporate insiders trading with knowledge of
material inside information); Meyer, supra note 7, at 46, 52 (Swiss banks have neither means
nor ability to ascertain whether investors use bank's facilities to evade United States laws).
I See House Report, supra note 7, at 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4394, 4397 (secret foreign bank accounts have allowed Americans to avoid securities
laws and regulations); Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 388-91 (bank secrecy laws
have hindered enforcement of United States insider trading laws); Compelled To Disclose,
supra note 8, at 91 (same).
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Although the SEC has a vital interest in gaining access to foreign
bank records that relate to suspected insider transactions, the United
States courts should be sensitive to other nations' interests when deciding
to order production or impose sanctions for nonproduction of foreign bank
information. 8 Broad assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction may offend
other nations and thereby impede the SEC's ability to investigate
occurences of international securities frauds.9 Several countries already
have enacted retaliatory legislation in response to the extraterritorial
application of United States laws.' Achieving international cooperation
in the investigation and prosecution of securities fraud cases would per-
mit the SEC to investigate transnational securities fraud without offen-
ding other nations.
International cooperation in securities regulation currently takes place
on an ad hoc basis."' Although little systematic cooperation exists between
nations' regulatory authorities, the authorities have assisted each other
in investigations of securities laws violations.' The French securities
regulation agency, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), has
notified the Swiss Bankers' Association and individual Swiss banks of
suspected insider transactions that originated in Swiss banks. 3 The banks
concerned often have made their own investigations and, without reveal-
ing confidential bank information, have informed COB of whether the
suspected insider transactions might have violated French law.' The
9 Extraterritorial Application, supra'note 1, at 190; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 72, at S 40 reporters' note 2 (United States courts' broad exercise of jurisdiction has
offended foreign governments).
Extraterritorial Application, supra note 1, at 190.
10 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 381 & n.267, 391 (recent British legisla-
tion may prevent British compliance with foreign authorities' requests for certain informa-
tion); Compelled To Disclose, supra, note 8, at 108 n.171 (nations that have enacted retaliatory
legislation in response to extraterritorial application of United States laws). Recent French
legislation may prevent French securities regulators from cooperating with the SEC or
other nations' regulatory authorities. Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 69.
The recent legislation prohibits French persons from disseminating economic, commercial,
or financial information to foreign authorities under certain circumstances. See id. at 69-70.
The French legislature adopted the new law as a result of a United States Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) investigation of several non-American companies. Id. at 70. The FTC
had applied administrative sanctions in the amount of $200,000 against a French company.
Id. at 70, 82 n.18.
101 See Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 59.
0 See id. (nations have cooperated in investigations of securities laws violations).
10 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 380 (French securities regulation agency
has informed Swiss banks of suspected insider trading violations originating from banks);
Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 67 (same). Between 1971 and 1980, the French
securities regulation agency, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), investigated
approximately 250 insider trading cases involving major buyers. Lee, Robert, Hirsch &
Pollack, supra note 1, at 67. In about 40 of the 250 investigations, the transactions had
originated in a foreign country, usually Switzerland. Id.
1.. See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 380; Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra
note 1, at 67. The COB found that Swiss banks made efforts to assist COB in insider trading
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British and Belgian authorities similarly have cooperated with COB.' COB
also has assisted the SEC with investigations of insider transactions.' 8
In the Investment Overseas Services (IOS) fraud cases,0 , another ex-
ample of ad hoc international cooperation, the SEC brought suit against
IOS and others who had engaged in fraud and other securities violations.'
The court that was overseeing the liquidation of IOS appointed a receiver
to liquidate the company, which had funds in Canadian, Luxembourg, and
Netherlands Antilles banks.109 The SEC alerted the countries concerned
to the fraud that IOS had perpetrated." In some instances, the foreign
securities regulation authorities and banks prevented IOS from remov-
ing funds from IOS bank accounts."' A committee composed of represen-
tatives from the countries involved in the IOS affair agreed to liquidate
IOS funds according to the laws of the respective countries holding the
company's funds."' The SEC, the United States receiver, and the foreign
fund liquidators thus worked together to liquidate IOS."' The cooperative
arrangement operated effectively and minimized jurisdictional and bank
secrecy obstacles.
14
Although ad hoc cooperation proved successful in the IOS case," 5 ad
hoc cooperation is not the best long-term solution to international securities
regulation problems."' Countries with bank secrecy laws may be unable
or unwilling to assit foreign authorities that seek disclosure of bank
information."7 In addition, countries may resent foreign authorities'
investigations because the banks were anxious to protect their reputations and wished to
avoid serving customers who violated French law. Id.
11 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 380; Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra
note 1, at 68. Although British and Belgian authorities have cooperated with COB, British
and Belgian bank secrecy laws have prevented the respective countries' authorities from
disclosing names of bank customers. Id.
10 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 381; Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra
note 1, at 69; see supra note 100 (French retaliatory legislation may prevent COB from pro-
viding further cooperation to other nations' regulatory authorities).
"I Various lawsuits were filed in connection with the Investment Overseas Services
j- (IOS) fraud. See, e.g., In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976); International Con-
trols Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974);, ITT v. Corn-
feld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
' See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 78-79 (discussion of IOS fraud cases).
10 See In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 466 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1976) (liquidation of IOS);
Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 nA (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(same); Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 78-79 (discussion of IOS fraud cases).
110 See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 78-79 (discussion of IOS fraud cases).
"1 See id. at 79-80.
112 See id. at 79.
1 See id.
See id.
" See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text (cooperation in IOS fraud cases).
"6 Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 59.
117 See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 67-68 (bank secrecy laws hinder
effective international cooperation); Miller, supra note 6, at 10-15 (Swiss bank secrecy);




attempts to assert extraterritorially the foreign nations' securities laws.'18
An ideal solution to multinational insider trading problems would be
to establish a system of international cooperation" 9 Cooperation would
deter international securities fraud because nations' securities regulators
would work together to investigate and prosecute defrauders.10 Coopera-
tion also could lead to more efficient operation of the international finan-
cial markets. 21 Achieving cooperation, however, would require compromise
because different countries have different practices, interests, and goals
concerning securities regulation." Nevertheless, as securities trading in-
creasingly assumes international aspects, cooperation becomes necessary
to ensure effective supervision of the securities market.'2
" See supra note 100 (retaliatory legislation).
" Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 393 (cooperation among nations' securities
regulation authorities would reduce use of secret foreign bank accounts to effect insider
trading schemes); Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 70 (nations should establish
system of cooperation to resolve problems that international securities trading presents);
Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 60 (nations' securities regulation authorities should
develop system of cooperation to resolve problems concerning international securities
regulation).
11 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 397 (cooperation would reduce use of
foreign banks to effect insider trading schemes); Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 60
(international cooperation can present powerful front against fraud).
11 Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 60.
' See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 73-74 (achieving cooperation
may be difficult because different countries have different goals regarding securities regula-
tion); Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 56 (establishing system of international coopera-
tion may be difficult because of countries' differing customs, interests, and law enforce-
ment policies). Countries' differing securities laws may pose a barrier to cooperation. Id.
Securities laws and enforcement techniques vary from country to country. See id. (extent
of securities regulation varies widely among countries). France, for example, enacted legisla-
tion prohibiting insider trading in 1970. Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 342; Lee,
Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 67; see supra notes 103-106 and accompanying
text (French cooperation in investigations of insider transactions). The French COB func-
tions much like the United States' SEC. Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 341 nA2.
The United Kingdom has outlawed insider trading since 1980. Id. at 338-39. The British
police have authority to investigate cases of suspected insider trading. Id. at 340. Although
the Federal Republic of Germany has no statutory proscriptions against insider trading,
German banks and corporations have enacted rules prohibiting insider transactions in
securities. MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES -CORPORATE INSIDERS 59-60 (L. Loss ed. 1976). See
generally Schwark, Regulation of German Capital Markets-Present Situation, Problems, and
Outlook, 1 J. ComP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 299, 308-09 (1978) (Federal Republic of Germany's
insider trading regulations). In Germany, a commission composed of corporate managers
investigates suspected insider transactions. MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-CORPORATE IN-
SIDERs, supra, at 60, 62.
Switzerland's laws do not prohibit insider trading in securities, but the Swiss never-
theless consider insider trading dishonorable. Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note
20, at pt. 1, 2. Swiss officials hope that by 1984 Switzerland will have enacted a law pro-
hibiting the misuse of inside information. Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord on Investigdtion of
Insider Trading, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.35, at 1538,1538 (Sept. 3,1982) [hereinafter
cited as Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord.].
" Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 397 (since securities trading is becoming
increasingly international in scope, nations should make efforts to achieve international
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The United States and Switzerland recently have established a system
of cooperation in the investigation of insider trading cases.'24 In August
1982, the two countries signed a Memorandum on Insider Trading
(Memorandum).' The Memorandum is a precedent-setting accord that per-
mits participating Swiss banks to furnish United States securities enforce-
ment officials with information on transactions conducted through Swiss
bank accounts when the transactions may involve insider trading. '26 The
American and Swiss authorities adopted the Memorandum because the
cooperation in securities regulation); Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 70
(nations should develop system of international cooperation for securities regulation); Williams
& Spencer, supra note 1, at 61-62 (formal system of international cooperation can provide
solution to problems that international securities trading presents).
124 See infra notes 125-135 and accompanying text (United States-Switzerland agree-
ment to cooperate in insider trading investigations).
" Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20; see Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord,
supra note 122, at 1538 (officials of United States and Switzerland signed Memorandum
on Insider Trading).
",' Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 1; see Swiss and U.S.
Reach Accord, supra note 122, at 1538. A 1977 treaty between the United States and
Switzerland provides for the two countries to cooperate in connection with investigations
and prosecutions of criminal offenses. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance, supra note 20, at
art. 1(1)(a). The treaty requires mutual cooperation, however, only when the offense under
investigation is a crime under the laws of both the United States and Switzerland. Id. arts.
1(1(a), 1(2), (42)(a). Since insider trading is not a crime under Swiss law, the 1977 treaty
generally does not require Swiss cooperation in investigating insider transactions involv-
ing Swiss participants. See Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. II,
3(b), pt. III, 1; cf. id. pt. II, 3(b) (1977 treaty may provide for cooperation in certain
insider trading cases). Consequently, the United States and Switzerland developed the
Memorandum on Insider Trading to allow assistance in insider trading investigations. Id.
at pt. III, 1. The provisions of the Memorandum on Insider Trading will terminate if
Switzerland enacts legislation prohibiting the misuse of inside information. See id., see also
Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord, supra note 122, at 1538 (Switzerland considering enacting
law prohibiting misuse of inside information).
Although the 1977 treaty does not apply to all insider trading cases, persons who violate
United States laws against insider trading also could be in violation of Swiss laws that
prohibit fraud, unfaithful management, or violation of business secrets. See Memorandum
on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. II, 3(b). If the insider transaction is a crime
under Swiss law, the SEC may obtain confidential Swiss bank information concerning the
transaction pursuant to the 1977 treaty. See id. The SEC used the 1977 treaty procedures
to attempt to obtain Swiss bank information to investigate suspected insider transactions
that took place during the 1981 merger of Santa Fe Industries and Kuwait Petroleum Cor-
poration. Swiss Court Rejects SEC Request in Santa Fe Insider Trading Case, 15 SEc. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 271 (Feb. 4,1983) [hereinafter cited as Swiss Court Rejects SECRe-
quest]; Legal Times, Jan. 31, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The United States Justice Department transmit-
ted the SEC's request for information to the Swiss government in March 1982. Swiss Court
Rejects SEC Request, supra, at 271. The Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters (Police Of-
fice) had decided to release the bank records to the United States authorities. Id. The per-
sons suspected of insider trading, however, challenged the Police Office's determination
in the Swiss courts. Id. The Supreme Court of Switzerland ruled 3-2 that the Swiss authorities
could not release the bank information to the SEC. Id. The swing judge supposedly based
his ruling on a technicality rather than on whether the alleged offenses constituted criminal
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countries recognized that ascertaining the identities of persons suspected
of insider trading is important to the enforcement of American securities
laws.1  Officials of the countries concurred that the use of Swiss banks
to effect insider transactions that violate American law is detrimental
to the interests of both the United States and Switzerland.128
The Swiss Bankers' Association will implement the terms of the
Memorandum by submitting a Private Agreement129 to Swiss banks that
might engage in trading on the United States securities markets." Banks
that sign the Private Agreement must disclose bank information pertain-
ing to insider transactions that the SEC or the Justice Department may
request.1 ' The Private Agreement provides for Swiss banks to disclose
bank information only when the alleged insider transaction occurred within
twenty-five trading days prior to a public announcement of a proposed
business combination or acquisition.1 2 In addition, the Private Agreement
activity under Swiss law. Id. The United States therefore might be able to submit a revised
application for the same information. Id.
Since the Memorandum on Insider Trading provides for Swiss cooperation in insider
trading investigations regardless of whether the suspect transaction constitutes a criminal
act under Swiss law, the SEC will be able to achieve Swiss cooperation in more investiga-
tions than would be possible under the 1977 treaty alone. See Memorandum on Insider
Trading, supra note 20, at pt. IIH, 1. Under the Memorandum on Insider Trading, however,
the SEC's requests for Swiss bank information must meet stringent procedural requirements.
See id. (criteria for release of Swiss bank information); infra notes 132-133 and accompany-
ing text (same).
17 See Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. I, 3.
1 Id. at 4.
12 Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association (July 14, 1982), reprinted in 14
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1740 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Private
Agreement].
1 See Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 2, pt. V, 3 (Swiss
Bankers' Association will submit Private Agreement to Swiss banks that might trade on
United States securities markets). American and Swiss officials expect that all Swiss banks
that trade in American capital markets will sign the Private Agreement. Swiss and U.S.
Reach Accord, supra note 122, at 1538. The Private Agreement establishes the terms of
the relationship between signatory banks and their customers who place orders with the
banks for execution on the United States securities markets. Memorandum on Insider
Trading, supra note 20, at pt. I1, 2 Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 12. Signatory
banks must inform their customers of the contents of tle Private Agreement. Id.
"I1 Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 1; Private Agreement,
supra note 129, at art. 4.
" Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 1. When the SEC or Justice Department
requires information to investigate a suspected insider transaction involving a Swiss bank,
the Justice Department must submit a written application to the Swiss Police Office. Id.
The Police Office in turn transmits the application to a Commission of the Swiss Bankers'
Association (Commission). See id. at art. 2(1) (Board of Directors of Swiss Bankers' Associa-
tion shall appoint Commission composed of three members and three deputies); id. at art.
3(1) (Commission shall handle requests for information that Police Office transmits to Com-
mission). The Commission has responsibility for analyzing United States authorities'
applications for assistance and contacting Swiss banks that must disclose information that
the United States authorities have requested. Id. at arts. 3, 4.
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provides for Swiss banks to cooperate in insider trading investigations
only when the suspect transaction meets certain criteria for trading volume
and price changes preceding public announcement of a business combina-
tion or tender offer that may indicate the existence of insider trading.3
To preserve banking confidentiality to the fullest extent possible, the
Memorandum and the Private Agreement provide that the SEC must
strive to keep secret the information that the SEC receives pursuant to
the Private Agreement." The SEC and the Justice Department may use
the Swiss bank information only in administrative or judicial proceedings




The specific requirements that trigger disclosure of Swiss bank infor-
mation under the Private Agreement as well as the limited ways in which
United States authorities may use the information appear to make the
" See id. at art. 3(4) (trading volume and price criteria). If the insider transaction under
investigation meets the trading volume and price criteria set forth in the Private Agree-
ment, then the Commission presumes that the SEC or Justice Department has made a
reasonable request for assistance. Id.; see supra note 132 (Commission of Swiss Bankers'
Association analyzes United States' requests for assistance in insider trading investiga-
tions). If the transaction fails to meet the criteria, the Commission reviews the application
for assistance and determines whether the United States authorities have reasonable grounds
for requesting Swiss banking information. Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 3(4).
When the Commission has determined to undertake the request for assistance, the Com-
mission orders the Swiss bank involved in the suspect transaction to prepare a report of
the transaction. Id. at art. 4(1). Upon receiving the Commission's order, the bank must notify
the customer whose activity instigated the investigation. Id. at art. 4(2). The bank must
invite the customer to provide the bank with information showing that the customer did
not violate the United States insider trading laws or that the United States' request for
information does not satisfy the requirements set forth in the Private Agreement. Id. The
bank must file with the Commission the bank's report and all information that the bank
received from the customer. Id. at art. 4(3)-(4). In addition, at the Commission's request,
the bank must freeze the customer's account to the extent of profits realized or losses avoided
from the alleged insider transaction. See id. at art. 9(1).
After receiving the bank's information, the Commission furnishes the Police Office with
a report containing the information that the American authorities requested. Id. at art.
5. The SEC receives the Commission's report after the Police Office has determined that
the report contains no information that could harm Swiss interests or innocent third par-
ties. Id. at art. 5. If the Police Office determines that sending the bank's report will harm
Swiss interests or innocent third parties, the Police Office must try to adapt the report
so that the SEC receives the requested information without damaging the interests of
Switzerland or third parties. Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III,
3. In certain circumstances, the Police Office will not transmit the Commission's report
to the SEC. See Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 5. The Police Office will not
send the report to the SEC if the bank's customer or report establish that the customer
was not an insider or that the customer did not place the purchase or sale order that the
SEC is investigating. Id. at art. 5(1)-(2); see id. at art. 5(2) (definition of insider).
1" See Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 3; Private Agree-
ment, supra note 129, at art. 3(5).
1" Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 3; Private Agreement,
supra note 129, at art. 3(5).
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Memorandum and the Private Agreement a successful compromise be-
tween the United States' need to learn the identities of inside traders
and Switzerland's desire to keep banking matters confidential."6 The
Memorandum and the Private Agreement should reduce the use of Swiss
bank accounts as conduits for insider transactions. ' The Memorandum
and the Private Agreement, however, have significant limitations. For
example, only the SEC and the Justice Department may have access to
the information that Swiss banks disclose pursuant to the Private
Agreement. ' Consequently, private parties who might have been injured
by the insider transaction under investigationmay not utilize the Swiss
bank information that the United States authorities have received by us-
ing Private Agreement procedures."9 In addition, the Private Agreement
applies only to insider transactions that involve business combinations
or acquisitions.'40 Thus, the Private Agreement will not provide for
disclosure of Swiss bank information when an insider with knowledge of
internal corporate developments other than a possible business combina-
tion or tender offer engages in insider transactions.'
Despite inherent limitations, the Memorandum and the Private Agree-
ment represent important developments for international securities
regulation4  Bilateral agreements such as the Memorandum on Insider
Trading that the United States and Switzerland have adopted could pro-
vide a basis for further international cooperation in insider trading cases.4
11 See Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord, supra note 122, at 1538 (in developing Private
Agreement, United States' and Switzerland's representatives attempted to balance interests
of respective countries).
Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 393.
11 Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 3 (information that
SEC obtains through use of Private Agreement shall be used only in administrative or
judicial proceedings that SEC of Justice Department brings to enforce laws prohibiting
insider trading); Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 3(5) (when SEC requests Swiss
banking information pursuant to Private Agreement, SEC must assure Swiss authorities
that SEC will not disclose banking information except in connection with SEC investiga-
tion or law enforcement action).
"I See Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 20, at pt. III, 3 (information that
Swiss authorities disclose pursuant to Private Agreement may not be used in proceedings
other than SEC or Justice Department actions to enforce laws against insider trading).
"' See Private Agreement, supra note 129, at art. 1 (Swiss bank may disclose banking
information relating to alleged insider transaction when transaction took place within twenty-
five trading days prior to business combination or acquisition).
'. Ease Bank-Secrecy, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2. When the Private Agreement does
not provide for disclosure of Swiss banking information, the Treaty on Mutual Assistance
may provide an alternative means for obtaining the information. See Treaty on Mutual
Assistance, supra note 20; supra note 126 (Treaty on Mutual Assistance may apply to some
insider trading violations).
"' See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 393 (United States-Swiss agreement is
key development in securities regulation); Swiss and U.S. Reach Accord, supra note 122,
at 1538 (same).
143 See Hawes, Lee & Robert, supra note 1, at 393 (United States-Swiss agreement can
provide pattern for similar agreements with other countries); Ease Bank-Secrecy, supra note
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Since international securities transactions affect a variety of nations,
however, the most effective method of achieving international coopera-
tion in securities regulation would be to develop a multilateral treaty."
A multilateral treaty would ensure long-range cooperation between
countries.'45 A multilateral treaty also could establish a uniform procedure
for cooperation in securities matters.'46
Commentators have suggested several procedures for international
cooperation in securities regulation.'47 As one alternative, countries could
adopt a system of cooperation among securities regulation agencies along
with third party verification.'48 Nations would agree to require financial
intermediaries to disclose the identites of beneficial owners of accounts
to designated independent accountants. 4' Third party verification would
reduce the use of secret foreign bank accounts to effect insider
transactions."' Cooperation with third party verification would preserve
traders' anonymity except when a securities regulation agency requires
information on illegal securities trading.'-"
Another cooperative procedure would be for nations to receive and
provide assistance through a multinational securities regulation
committee. 15 Securities regulators from participating countries would
serve on the committee."" The committee would concern itself with super-
vising only companies that voluntarily participate in the international
securities market." The committee would serve as a clearinghouse for
information, encourage exchange of ideas and experiences, and assist in
harmonization of nations' diverse disclosure and accounting standards."'
Another procedure for international cooperation involves establishing
5, at 6, col. 2 (Justice Department contemplates negotiations with Cayman Islands, Panama,
Bahamas, and Bermuda to reach agreement similar to Swiss agreement).
Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollock, supra note 1, at 70, 73.
145 See Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 60 (treaty would ensure long-range
cooperation).
14 See id. at 60-61 (nations should work toward negotiating multilateral treaty on in-
ternational securities trading to establish formal procedure for cooperation).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 145-146 (multilateral treaty could provide for
international cooperation in insider trading investigations); infra text accompanying notes
149-161 (methods of achieving cooperation).




1 Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 73; Williams & Spencer, supra note
1, at 60.
5 Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 61.
65 Id. at 60. Under the regime of an international securities coordination committee,
authority to regulate companies that trade solely in domestic markets would remain with
domestic securities agencies. Id. Companies that trade in both domestic and foreign markets
would be subject to rules of both the domestic regulators and the international committee.
See id. at 61.
15 Id. at 60.
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international standards for securities trading. 5' International securities
standards could provide that countries adopting the standards will refuse
to accept securities trades from countries that do not reveal information
about the beneficial owners of securities." As a further alternative for
establishing international cooperation, nations could create an international
securities agency."' The agency would have the authority to establish stan-
dards for both international and domestic trading of securities."9 Nations,
however, would be reluctant to surrender regulatory control to an inter-
national body." Consequently, nations probably would not take initiatives
to create an international securities agency which would have the authority
to regulate purely domestic trading."'
International participation in securities trading will continue to pre-
sent challenges to domestic securities regulators. Nations should respond
to internationalization of the securities market by establishing a system
of regulatory cooperation." 2 To achieve uniform and long-range coopera-
tion, countries should develop a multilateral treaty that emboides a pro-
cedure for regulating international securities trades.' Effective regulatory
cooperation would reduce the use of the international securities market
as a conduit for unlawful securities transactions.'64
DONA A. SZAK
" Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note 1, at 70, 73.
I" d. Since nations have varying standards of securities regulation, companies and
investors may engage in regulatory forum shopping. Williams & Spencer, supra note 1,
at 59. Investors sometimes have chosen to engage in securities trading through Swiss banks
because the banks may not reveal information about bank customers. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text (Swiss bank secrecy laws have hindered efforts to learn identities of
persons engaging in unlawful securities transactions); supra notes 18-24 and accompanying
text (Swiss bank secrecy laws). To adopt standards providing that countries will refuse
to accept securities trades from countries that do not reveal information about the beneficial
owners of securities would reduce incentives to utilize banks subject to secrecy laws to
perpetrate unlawful securities transactions. See Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, supra note
1, at 70, 73.




'. Id. at 60. The SEC has made efforts to accomodate foreign participation in American
securities markest. See, e.g., Extraterritorial Application, supra note 1, at 195-96 (SEC's
efforts to accomodate foreign traders and issuers); Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at
58-59 (SEC approval of New York Stock Exchange rule regarding foreign traders). In addi-
tion, the European Economic Community has prepared a draft directive on insider trading.
Lee, Robert, Hirsch and Pollack, supra note 1, at 71-73. If adopted, each member of the
European Economic Community would have to alter its laws to make insider trading an
offense. Id.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 144-161 (describing possible methods of interna-
tional cooperation in securities regulation).
"I See Williams & Spencer, supra note 1, at 60 (international cooperation in securities
regulation can present powerful front against fraud).
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